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Australia, along with 36 other countries in the West-
ern Paciﬁ  c Region, was declared free of poliomyelitis by the 
World Health Organization in October 2000. Yet, the per-
sistence of wild poliovirus in the 4 remaining polio-endemic 
countries—Afghanistan, India, Nigeria, and Pakistan—pos-
es a risk for its importation into all countries declared polio 
free. We describe the public health response and outcomes 
resulting from the importation of a wild poliovirus infection in 
Melbourne, Australia, in July 2007. This response, based on 
an assessment of the risk for transmission, included offer-
ing vaccination with inactivated polio vaccine to the contacts 
and placing the index patient in isolation and the household 
contacts in quarantine until consecutive fecal specimens 
were negative for poliovirus by culture. The experience 
gained from the polio importation event in Australia may as-
sist other polio-free countries to prepare for, and respond to, 
a similar event. No secondary clinical cases resulted from 
this importation.
S
ince 2006, wild poliovirus has been endemic in only 
4 countries: Afghanistan, India, Nigeria, and Pakistan. 
Although many countries have not reported a case of po-
liomyelitis caused by wild poliovirus for some years, they 
remain at risk for importation of the disease. Australia and 
the other countries of the Western Paciﬁ  c Region were de-
clared polio free in October 2000 (1). However, the last 
reported case of wild poliovirus infection in Australia was 
imported from Turkey in 1977 (2). National departments 
of health in this region must remain vigilant for such an 
event and respond appropriately to reduce the risk for local 
transmission.
The World Health Organization (WHO) Global Polio 
Eradication Initiative recommends clinical surveillance for 
cases of acute ﬂ  accid paralysis in children <15 years of age 
and suspected paralytic polio in a person of any age as the 
most sensitive means of detecting a case of imported po-
liomyelitis in countries declared polio free (3). The Aus-
tralian government initiated surveillance for acute ﬂ  accid 
paralysis, following the WHO guidelines, in 1995. WHO 
established a global polio laboratory network, which in-
cludes a Polio Regional Reference Laboratory in Australia, 
to conﬁ  rm poliovirus infection because other conditions 
manifesting acute paralysis can mimic polio. Nevertheless, 
Australia’s ability to detect and respond effectively to the 
importation of a wild poliovirus infection has been ques-
tioned because gaps have occurred in surveillance for acute 
ﬂ  accid paralysis surveillance and in the referral of fecal 
specimens for laboratory testing (4).
Australia began exclusive use of inactivated polio 
vaccine (IPV) in place of the Sabin oral polio vaccine on 
November 1, 2005. In Victoria in 2007, the proportion of 
children who received at least 3 doses of polio vaccine was 
92.8% at 12 months of age and 95.9% at 2 years of age. 
Coverage with at least 4 doses of polio vaccine was 91.4% 
at 6 years of age. No reliable data exist on vaccination cov-
erage with polio vaccine in the adult population.
We describe the public health response to an impor-
tation of wild poliovirus infection that occurred in Mel-
bourne, Australia, in July 2007; the last reported case of 
polio in Australia was in 1977 (2). The issues addressed as 
a result of this event would be similar for other countries, 
and the lessons learned may be incorporated into national 
planning for a polio outbreak (which requires only a single 
conﬁ  rmed case).
Notiﬁ  cation of the Index Case
On July 7, 2007, the Department of Human Services 
(DHS) in Victoria, Australia, was notiﬁ  ed of a suspected 
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case of imported poliomyelitis in a 22-year-old man (a 
university student). The patient, who was studying in Mel-
bourne, had returned home to Pakistan on March 13, 2007, 
and in early June, he visited Islamabad and the North-West 
Frontier Province. On June 22, 2007, fever, nausea, and 
pain in the lower back and legs developed and progressed 
to lower limb weakness. The symptoms appeared to re-
solve, and he returned to Melbourne, arriving on a ﬂ  ight 
from Bangkok, Thailand, on July 2, 2007. However, he 
remained at home with back pain and lower limb weak-
ness and consulted a general practitioner on July 6, 2007. 
He was advised to go to a hospital, where the emergency 
department admitted him for further investigation. The pa-
tient reported receiving at least 3 doses of oral poliomyeli-
tis vaccine as a child.
A case report describing the clinical features and treat-
ment of the patient and the initial laboratory investigation 
was published by Stewardson et al. (5). Brieﬂ  y, a magnetic 
resonance image of the patient’s spine, performed on July 
7, indicated increased signal in the anterior horn cells, 
which is highly suggestive of poliomyelitis. The patient was 
placed in a single room with enteric precautions, and DHS 
was notiﬁ  ed of the diagnosis of poliomyelitis. Although 
an initial pan-enterovirus reverse transcription–PCR (RT-
PCR) performed directly on a fecal specimen collected on 
July 7 was reported as negative, the National Polio Refer-
ence Laboratory conﬁ  rmed the diagnosis of poliomyelitis 
by isolation of non–Sabin-like poliovirus type 1 on July 13. 
The virus was subsequently reported to have high nucleic 
acid sequence identity with wild poliovirus isolates from 
Pakistan, which provided an epidemiologic link with the 
patient’s travel history. The index patient was placed in 
isolation in the hospital until 2 successive fecal specimens, 
collected 1 week apart, were negative for poliovirus by vi-
ral culture and RT-PCR (a total of 34 days).
Public Health Response
DHS coordinated the public health response in the 
state of Victoria, while national and international respon-
sibilities were handled by the Australian government De-
partment of Health and Ageing. At the national level, this 
included liaising with the Communicable Diseases Net-
work of Australia, the Australian Health Protection Com-
mittee, and the Public Health Laboratory Network. The 
case was one of the ﬁ  rst reported to WHO under the Inter-
national Health Regulations (2005), which came into ef-
fect in June 2007 and require member countries to notify 
WHO of poliomyelitis cases (6). On conﬁ  rmation of the 
diagnosis of poliomyelitis, DHS performed a risk assess-
ment for the potential infection of contacts of the index 
patient with wild poliovirus. Contacts were grouped as the 
following: 1) close contacts who resided with or visited 
the index patient’s residence, 2) fellow passengers on the 
airplane from Bangkok to Melbourne, 3) public contacts 
and staff at the general practitioner’s clinic, and 4) public 
contacts and healthcare workers (HCWs) at the hospital 
(Table 1).
Household contacts were judged to be at highest risk. 
Anyone who used the same toilet as the index patient be-
fore it had been cleaned was regarded as being at lesser 
risk, especially because the patient had not used a toilet to 
have a bowel movement either on the plane, at the general 
practitioner’s clinic, or at the hospital emergency depart-
ment. In virtually all instances, the vaccination history of 
contacts was uncertain. Although the likelihood of trans-
mission was deemed to be low, a cautious approach to the 
situation led to a comprehensive public health response.
Household Contacts
Household contacts of the index patient were identi-
ﬁ  ed as his 5 housemates, 1 visitor who had stayed over-
night after the index patient’s return from overseas, and a 
housekeeper who cleaned the index-patient’s premises, but 
did not reside there. The household contacts were placed 
under a public health order following the state’s health laws 
to remain in home quarantine until released by DHS. The 
5 housemates were quarantined at their principal place of 
residence, together with the visitor who joined them. The 
housekeeper was quarantined in her own house. The con-
tacts were provided with information on poliomyelitis and 
given booster doses of IPV. Doses of IPV were adminis-
tered subcutaneously, according to the Australian immuni-
zation guidelines (7), thus avoiding the potential for provo-
cation poliomyelitis (8). In hindsight, serum collection 
from close contacts before booster vaccination would have 
enabled testing for immunoglobulin M against poliovirus 
to assess the risk for transmission of wild poliovirus due to 
asymptomatic infection. All household contacts remained 
in quarantine until 2 fecal specimens, collected >24 hours 
apart, were negative by viral culture and RT-PCR (a total 
of 16 days) (Table 1).
Airplane Contacts
The index patient reported that he had used the toi-
let on the ﬂ  ight from Bangkok to Melbourne, although 
only to urinate. Although the risk to the fellow passen-
gers was deemed to be low, contact tracing was instituted 
for the passengers on the ﬂ  ight. Two hundred thirty-ﬁ  ve 
passengers terminated their journey in Melbourne (a few 
passengers went on to other areas in Australia), and their 
incoming passenger cards were obtained by DHS through 
the Department of Health and Ageing. Upon laboratory 
conﬁ  rmation of the diagnosis of the traveler’s poliomyeli-
tis, a media bulletin was released by DHS on July 14, ad-
vising the public of the case and asking passengers from 
the ﬂ  ight to contact a national public health telephone 
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line to obtain further information and to receive a booster 
polio vaccination. Media interviews were conducted by 
DHS staff, and a health alert was issued for hospitals in 
Victoria.
DHS also contacted the airplane passengers directly by 
telephone, letter, or email to provide information on polio-
myelitis and offer a single booster dose of IPV, regardless 
of previous poliomyelitis vaccination history. The results 
of the airplane contact tracing are shown in Table 2. Seven 
airport workers responsible for cleaning the plane used by 
the index patient were also given IPV by DHS, while the 
Department of Health and Ageing agreed to undertake fol-
low-up of the ﬂ  ight crew.
Contacts at the Medical Clinic
On July 6, 2007, the index patient consulted a general 
practitioner about the symptoms that recurred after his ar-
rival in Melbourne on July 2. He later informed DHS that 
he had used a toilet at the clinic to pass urine only and so 
the same risk assessment criteria were used as for the air-
plane contacts. Nine healthcare staff, 24 patients, and 6 of 
their friends or relatives were administered IPV.
Hospital Contacts
We identiﬁ  ed persons who may have used a toilet at 
the hospital Emergency Department and on the ward where 
the index patient stayed before isolation procedures were 
instituted, and we recommended that they receive IPV (Ta-
ble 1). In total, 37 hospital patients or their friends or rela-
tives were administered IPV by their own doctors, and 3 
had recently received their routine childhood vaccinations.
HCWs who possibly had contact with the index patient 
were regarded as at risk, and a total of 83 hospital staff mem-
bers each received 1 dose of IPV. Australian-born HCWs 
were judged likely to have been fully immunized and there-
fore less likely to be at risk. Nine overseas-born hospital staff 
members who could not provide evidence of vaccination or a 
booster dose within the last 10 years, per the Australian im-
munization guidelines (7), were requested to provide 2 fecal 
specimens, at least 24 hours apart, for virus culture.
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Table 1. Summary of the public health response and the outcomes to the importation of wild poliovirus, Australia, July 2007* 
Persons investigated  Response Outcome
Index patient  Isolated in hospital after magnetic resonance image 
was suggestive of poliomyelitis. 
Discharged when 2 fecal specimens, collected 
at least 7 d apart, were negative for enterovirus 
by cell culture and RT-PCR (total of 34 d). 
Household contacts  5 housemates, 1 visitor, and the housekeeper 
received IPV and placed in home quarantine under a 
Public Health Order. Recommend serum collection 
before vaccinating contacts to test for IgM against 
polio. Another friend who visited the residence of the 
index case was boosted with IPV only. 
Home quarantine lifted when 2 fecal 
specimens, collected 24–48 h apart, were 
negative for enterovirus by cell culture and RT-
PCR. Housemates required support to ensure 
compliance, which included grocery deliveries, 
bill payments, and a range of other assistance.
Airplane contacts Media release informing public of imported case of 
polio and offer of vaccination for persons who 
disembarked in Melbourne. DHS provided with 235 
Passenger Declaration cards of persons who 
disembarked in Melbourne. DHS undertook contact 
tracing of airplane passengers (Table 2). One 
teenage passenger hospitalized with fever and 
diarrhea. 10 persons not on the airplane manifest 
were vaccinated as their details could not be readily 
determined; 7 airport workers who cleaned the plane 
were vaccinated with IPV. 
Hospitalized passenger: single CSF and 3 
fecal specimens (collected more than 24 h 
apart), were tested for enterovirus; CSF 
positive for enterovirus RNA by RT-PCR; all 
other tests negative by cell culture and RT-
PCR.
Medical clinic contacts   14 staff members and 81 patients initially regarded as 
potentially at risk for exposure. Nine staff identified as 
at risk and offered vaccination with IPV. 24 patients 
and 6 relatives/friends identified as at risk and offered 
vaccination with IPV. Letters sent to a further 8 
recommending vaccination. Adult patient later 
hospitalized with fever, gastrointestinal illness and 
general weakness and spouse had respiratory illness. 
Upon discharge, they were asked to remain at home 
pending specimen results. 7-y-old child was later 
hospitalized with seizures. 
Adult admitted to hospital and spouse: 2 fecal 
specimens, collected more than 24 h apart, 
negative for enterovirus by cell culture and RT-
PCR. Child who was hospitalized: 1 CSF and a 
fecal specimen tested for enterovirus; CSF 
positive for enterovirus RNA by RT-PCR, fecal 
specimen negative for enterovirus by RT-PCR 
and cell culture. 
Contacts at Box Hill Hospital  102 patients and 63 relatives/friends from either the 
Emergency Department or the Ward were identified 
as at risk: 17 were not contactable; 37 were 
vaccinated by their own doctors; 83 HCWs were 
identified as at risk and vaccinated with IPV. 
Identification of 9 overseas-born HCWs without 
evidence of recent polio vaccination.
Symptomatic HCW with back pain: single fecal 
specimen negative for enterovirus by RT-PCR 
and cell culture. HCWs without evidence of 
recent polio vaccination: 2 fecal specimens, 
collected more than 24 h apart, negative for 
enterovirus by RT-PCR and cell culture. 
*IPV, inactivated polio vaccine; RT-PCR, reverse transcription–PCR; Ig, immunoglobulin; CSF, cerebrospinal fluid; HCW, healthcare worker.  SYNOPSIS
Symptomatic Contacts
Three symptomatic cases that required hospitalization 
were identiﬁ  ed during contact tracing (Table 1). A teenager 
on the same ﬂ  ight from Bangkok as the index patient was 
hospitalized with fever and diarrhea, and a 7-year-old child 
who attended the same general practitioner’s clinic as the in-
dex patient was admitted with seizures. Cerebrospinal ﬂ  uid 
(CSF) collected from both patients was positive for entero-
virus RNA by RT-PCR, but fecal specimens were negative 
by cell culture and RT-PCR. The enteroviruses detected in 
the CSF from both patients were not identiﬁ  ed. In addition, 
a man who attended the general practitioner’s clinic was 
hospitalized with fever, gastrointestinal illness, and general 
weakness. Two fecal specimens were collected from the pa-
tient and also from his spouse, who was having a respiratory 
illness, as a precautionary measure. The couple was asked 
to remain at home in voluntary quarantine until laboratory 
testing of the specimens was completed. All fecal specimens 
were reported as negative for enterovirus by cell culture and 
RT-PCR. One hospital HCW who had contact with the index 
patient exhibited backache, but a fecal specimen was nega-
tive for enterovirus by RT-PCR and cell culture.
Cleaning and Disinfection
Lastly, the issue arose of cleaning and disinfection of 
toilets used by the index patient. Survival of poliovirus is 
favored by lower temperatures and high relative humidity. 
The virus can survive outside the human body for weeks 
at room temperature (9). Effective disinfectants include 
sodium hypochlorite, glutaraldehyde, or formaldehyde 
solutions. The WHO Guide to Hygiene and Sanitation in 
Aviation (10) indicates that the correct use of sodium hy-
pochlorite is to apply a solution of 100 mg/L and keep it 
in contact with surfaces for 30 minutes; then the surfaces 
should be rinsed with warm water and dried.
Discussion
The 2007 wild poliovirus importation generated wide-
spread media coverage around Australia that assisted with 
contact tracing. However, tracing the passengers who dis-
embarked with the index patient in Melbourne was difﬁ  cult 
because of poor handwriting and inaccurate information on 
many of the arrival cards. This experience has implications 
for the urgent tracing of persons potentially exposed to oth-
er infectious diseases of public health signiﬁ  cance, such as 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza. Despite extensive contact tracing, 26 
(11%) of the 235 passengers could not be contacted. For 
the 96 passengers who chose to see their own doctor for 
vaccination and the 29 passengers who were contacted by 
letter or email, outcome is not known.
In large part, the laboratory investigation of the index 
patient and household contacts followed the procedures 
recommended by WHO for routine acute ﬂ  accid paralysis 
surveillance with collection of 2 fecal specimens obtained 
24–48 hours apart, due to intermittent virus shedding, for 
virus culture (11). Virus cell culture was accepted by DHS 
as the approved standard for the test procedures, in agree-
ment with the recommendation by WHO. This proved de-
cisive because, for the ﬁ  rst fecal specimen, enterovirus was 
not detected by RT-PCR performed directly on the speci-
men (5). RT-PCR is still a powerful tool for enterovirus 
detection as exempliﬁ  ed by the test results for the 2 positive 
CSF specimens. The testing, by cell culture and RT-PCR, 
of specimens from persons with suspected poliomyelitis 
and their contacts is recommended. This ensures that test 
results are determined by using the most rapid and sensitive 
methods available.
Household contacts of case-patients are at high risk of 
infection (12). We recommended that they be quarantined 
at home and that stool specimens be collected a minimum 
of 3 days after the ﬁ  rst contact with the index patient to al-
low sufﬁ  cient time for an infection to become established. 
As excretion of poliovirus in the feces can continue for sev-
eral weeks (13,14), we sought advice from WHO and the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Atlanta, GA, 
USA) regarding when the index patient and the household 
contacts could be released from isolation and home quaran-
tine, respectively. The criteria accepted by DHS was for 2 
fecal specimens, collected 7 days apart for the index patient 
and >24 hours apart for the household contacts, to be nega-
tive for poliovirus isolation by cell culture (M. Pallansch, 
S. Roesel, pers. comm.).
The time taken to determine a negative result by 
cell culture leads to an inevitable delay in ﬁ  nalizing pa-
tient tests, which, in the circumstances described in this 
report, had implications for when the index patient and 
household contacts could be released from hospital isola-
tion and home quarantine, respectively: 34 days for the 
index patient and 16 days for the household contacts. It 
should be noted that household quarantine of the contacts 
required substantial logistical support by DHS staff in 
terms of food and entertainment. This also has implica-
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Table 2. Outcome of tracing the 235 airline passengers who 
arrived in Melbourne, Australia, on the same flight as the index 




Vaccinated with IPV by DHS  77
Preferred vaccination by own doctor  96
Refused vaccination  4
Recently vaccinated against polio  3
Contacted by letter  14
Contacted by email  15
Subtotal 209
Incorrect email or mail address  12
Illegible incoming passenger cards  14
*IPV, inactivated polio vaccine; DHS, Department of Health Services. Public Health Response to Imported Poliomyelitis
tions for large-scale quarantine as would be required in an 
inﬂ  uenza pandemic.
No published evidence is available on the role of po-
lio vaccine as postexposure prophylaxis against paralytic 
disease. However, in persons with some preexisting immu-
nity, which would include most of the Australian popula-
tion, boosting the immune response with a single dose of 
oral polio vaccine or IPV is likely to reduce both pharyngeal 
and intestinal excretion of poliovirus in those who have been 
infected (15). The extent to which one undertakes tracing of 
contacts who used the same toilet was extensively debated 
by the Communicable Diseases Network Australia and the 
Australian Health Protection Committee. DHS opted to in-
vite nonhousehold contacts to come to departmental ofﬁ  ces 
or see their own physician for a booster dose of IPV and to be 
given information on the disease and its symptoms and signs 
as a precautionary measure. Booster doses of IPV have also 
been recommended for HCWs who have close contact with 
patients who might be excreting wild poliovirus (15). We 
followed this advice with the HCWs involved with the index 
patient, but issues arose in relation to the lack of immuni-
zation records, particularly with some of the overseas-born 
HCWs. We now advise that HCWs in close contact with an 
index patient with poliomyelitis, who have no recorded im-
munization history or who are not fully vaccinated, should 
provide 2 fecal specimens collected 24–48 hours apart and 
complete a course of vaccination with IPV, in accordance 
with the current Australian immunization guidelines (7).
Conclusions
Until this imported case, poliomyelitis caused by wild 
poliovirus had not been reported in Australia for 30 years. 
The case necessitated a rapid and extensive public health 
response. The age and vaccination history of the index pa-
tient highlight the need for public health ofﬁ  cials world-
wide to prepare for imported cases of suspected polio in 
persons of any age and with prior vaccination. The experi-
ence gained from the public health response to the importa-
tion in 2007, particularly in relation to tracing of contacts, 
isolation of cases, and quarantine of close contacts, has 
been incorporated into the national outbreak response plan 
for the investigation of cases of acute ﬂ  accid paralysis and 
suspected polio, published by the Australian government’s 
Department of Health and Ageing (16).
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